ROSEMARY LEDET, Judge.

This is a class action arising out of a project to sandblast and paint a large, elevated water tower that abuts a residential neighborhood in Algiers, Louisiana (the "Algiers Water Tower"). Alleging damages directly resulting from the adverse effects of the project, the plaintiffs brought this class action against the general contractor, Capitol Enterprise, Inc. ("Capitol"); and the owner of the water tower, the Sewerage & Water Board of New Orleans (the "S & WB"). After settling with Capitol, the S & WB, and the primary insurers, the plaintiffs went to trial against the excess insurer, the Fireman's Fund Insurance Company ("FFIC"). From a judgment on liability in favor of the plaintiff-class and a judgment on damages in favor of each of the seven named class representatives (awarding each of them $20,000 in compensatory damages), FFIC appeals. The class representatives individually and on behalf of the class (collectively "Plaintiffs") answer the appeal. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In April 2001, the S & WB entered into a contract with Capitol to sandblast and paint the Algiers Water Tower. Because of the proximity of the water tower to a residential neighborhood, the contract contained requirements designed to protect the neighborhood.1 One of those requirements was the contractor's use of a 100% containment shroud. Explaining that requirement, the contract documents state:

The "Plans and Notes to Contractor for the Project" likewise reference the contractor's mandatory use of a SSPC Class 1 A containment and state that "[t]he containment must maintain a negative pressure as verified by both visual and instrument observations. This pressure shall be sufficient to prevent any spent material or dust from leaving the enclosure during the cleaning." The contractor also was assigned the responsibility to ensure the containment system satisfied the SSPC standards and to comply with all state and federal regulations.

The exterior sandblasting and painting of the water tower took place between December 2001 and March 2002 with actual work taking place on approximately thirty-eight calendar days. During the project, significant amounts of silica, sand, dust, and other particles were released into the surrounding area. According to David Mitchell, Ph.D., Plaintiffs' air modeling expert, Capitol's sandblasting had a significant impact on the neighborhood abutting the water tower. Dr. Mitchell noted that the work records document numerous problems with the emission containment system, document numerous complaints by the public from the neighborhood surrounding the Algiers Water Tower, and document numerous violations of visible emission limits. Dr. Mitchell opined that "the weather conditions (wind speed and direction) and lack of proper containment procedures by Capitol Enterprises, Inc. permitted the transport and disposition of significant concentrations of airborne particulate matter and dust downwind of the job site." These emissions were caused, at least in part, by Capitol's deviation from the specifications by using 85% mesh containment as opposed to the required 100% containment.

In April 2002, Helen Benn Jones; Johnny Jones, III; Barbara Benn; Evelyn Gastinell; and Melanie Williams commenced the instant class action against Capitol and the S & WB. Plaintiffs alleged that Capitol's sandblasting and painting activities directly and adversely impacted the residents, home owners, and businesses in the area adjacent to the water tower. The petition avers that Plaintiffs were damaged in the following respects:

In March 2004, following an extensive evidentiary hearing, the trial court certified the class, which it defined as follows:

The trial court defined the boundaries as follows:

The trial court in its judgment recognized two additional class representatives — Bernice Noil and Augustine Cook — bringing the total number of class representatives to seven. No appeal was taken from the judgment certifying the class.

In March 2005, Plaintiffs filed a first amending petition adding as defendants the primary insurers: Royal Insurance Company of America ("Royal"), and American International Specialty Lines Insurance Company ("AISLIC"). On Plaintiffs' motion, the trial court dismissed AISLIC as a defendant without prejudice.

In April 2005, Plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of insurance coverage available to Capitol and the S & WB under Royal's policy. Particularly, Plaintiffs sought a declaration that the general aggregate limits of Royal's policy ($2,000,000.00) should apply rather than the per occurrence limits ($1,000,000.00). The trial court granted Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment. This court dismissed Royal's appeal from this judgment on the basis that it should not have been certified as final and appealable because this issue was "but one of many insurance issues to be decided before a trier-of-fact can reach the issue of damages." Jones v. Capitol Enterprises, 06-0163 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/20/06), 939 So.2d 742 (unpub.).

Meanwhile, in October 2005, Plaintiffs filed a second amending petition adding several new defendants including FFIC, as the excess insurer to Royal and AISLIC; and Delta Testing & Inspection, Inc. ("Delta"), the consulting company the S & WB retained to monitor quality on the Algiers Water Tower project. In June 2007, FFIC filed a motion for summary judgment contending that coverage was excluded by the pollution and lead exclusions of its policy.2 In August 2007, the trial court denied FFIC's motion.

Also in August 2007, the trial court approved a partial settlement agreement between Plaintiffs and multiple defendants: Capitol, the S & WB, Delta, Delta's insurer (Landmark), Royal, and AISLIC. Plaintiffs released all claims against Capitol and the S & WB, but reserved their right to pursue any collectible insurance available to those defendants, specifically from the excess insurer, FFIC, consistent with the applicable jurisprudence, particularly Gasquet v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 391 So.2d 466 (La.App. 4th Cir.1980).3 The parties expressly acknowledged that the excess insurer, particularly FFIC, would be "granted a credit consistent with the jurisprudence as set forth in Gasquet, id., against total recoverable damages, if the insurance policies mandate such a credit, and only to the extent that such credits legally exist."4 Pursuant to the settlement, Capitol and the S & WB remained in the suit as nominal defendants for purposes of future litigation to establish the liability, if any, of the excess insurer, FFIC.

In October 2007, a three-day trial was held. Two types of issues were tried: (i) the class-wide, common issues of the liability of Capitol and the S & WB (the nominal defendants) and FFIC's insurance coverage, and (ii) the individual issue of the damages due the seven named class representatives. At the close of Plaintiffs' case, FFIC filed a motion for directed verdict, which the trial court denied.

In June 2008, the trial court rendered judgment and detailed reasons for judgment. The June 2008 judgment incorrectly awarded class-wide damages based on four geographic "zones" outlined in the reasons for judgment. The June 2008 judgment further provided that "for the written reasons assigned" judgment is rendered for the five (as opposed to seven) named class representatives of $20,000 each against Capitol, the S & WB, and FFIC.5 The judgment still further provided that FFIC was entitled to a credit in the amount of $3,889,623.90, which was based on the underlying policy limits contained in the AISLIC policy (after deduction of approved fees and costs) of $1,889,623.90, and the Royal policy of $2,000,000.00 ("FFIC's Credit"). From this judgment, cross-motions for new trial were filed.

In March 2011, the trial court granted the motions for new trial and issued an amended judgment. The amended judgment excluded the class-wide damage award, but included the same award to the named class representatives — all seven of them — of $20,000 each in compensatory damages ($140,000 total). In the amended judgment, Capitol and the S & WB were found equally at fault. As the trial court noted in its original written reasons, it found fault on the part of both Capitol and the S & WB for the following reasons:6

The trial court found that the S & WB's liability "arises out of" Capitol's work at the Algiers Water Tower. As noted elsewhere in this opinion, this is a requirement under FFIC's policy for coverage as an additional insured. The trial court thus found as a matter of fact and law that FFIC had a policy of excess liability insurance that covered both Capitol, as a direct insured, and the S & WB, as an additional insured.

The trial court limited the judgment against the nominal defendants, Capitol and the S & WB, "to the extent that there is available applicable insurance policies" to cover their liability including but not limited to FFIC. The trial court limited the judgment against FFIC to its policy limit of $10,000,000, and recognized FFIC's Credit of $3,889,623.90.

The trial court found as a matter of fact and law that as a direct result of the sandblasting and painting of the Algiers Water Tower the class representatives suffered injuries and damages legally caused by Capitol and the S & WB. Accordingly, the trial court rendered judgment against FFIC, in solido with its insureds, Capitol and the S & WB, for "all compensatory damages determined herein for the plaintiff class representatives [$20,000.00 each] and [for damages] hereafter determined for the class members, with judicial interest from date of demand on April 16, 2002, until paid, and for all costs." From this judgment, FFIC appeals;7 Plaintiffs answer the appeal.8

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under the Louisiana Constitution, "appellate jurisdiction of a court of appeal extends to law and facts." La. Const. Art. 5, § 10. Questions of fact are reviewed under the manifest error standard. See Ferrell v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 94-1252, pp. 3-4 (La.2/20/95), 650 So.2d 742, 745. Mixed questions of law and fact are also reviewed under the manifest error standard. Chimneywood Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Eagan Ins. Agency, Inc., 10-0368, 10-0369, p. 5 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/2/11), 57 So.3d 1142, 1146 (citing CII Carbon, L.L.C. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Louisiana, Inc., 05-0071 (La.App. 4 Cir. 8/17/05), 918 So.2d 1060, 1065). "If the trial court's findings are reasonable in light of the record reviewed in its entirety, the appellate court may not reverse." Arabie v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 10-2605 (La.3/13/12), 89 So.3d 307 (citing Sistler v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 558 So.2d 1106, 1112 (La. 1990)). "[W]hen there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be manifestly erroneous." Arabie, supra (citing Stobart v. State, Through Department of Transportation and Development, 617 So.2d 880, 883 (La.1993)).

Questions of law are reviewed de novo "without deference to the legal conclusions of the courts below." Durio v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 11-0084, p. 14 (La.10/25/11), 74 So.3d 1159, 1168. As to questions of law, "the standard of review of an appellate court is simply whether the court's interpretive decision is legally correct." Ohm Lounge, L.L.C. v. Royal St. Charles Hotel, L.L.C., 10-1303, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/21/11), 75 So.3d 471, 474 (citing Glass v. Alton Ochsner Medical Foundation, 02-0412, p. 3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/6/02), 832 So.2d 403, 405). "[I]f the decision of the trial court is based upon an erroneous application of law rather than on a valid exercise of discretion, the decision is not entitled to deference by the reviewing court." Id. (citing Pelleteri v. Caspian Group Inc., 02-2141, pp. 6-7 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/2/03), 851 So.2d 1230, 1234-35).

A trial court's ruling denying a motion to decertify a class is one involving a valid exercise of discretion and therefore is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Billieson v. City of New Orleans, 09-0410, 09-0811, p. 9 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/12/09), 26 So.3d 796, 802, writ denied, 10-0064 (La.6/4/10), 38 So.3d 301 (citing Doerr v. Mobil Oil Co., 04-1789, p. 4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/14/06), 935 So.2d 231, 234); Richardson v. American Cyanamid Co., 99-675 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/29/00), 757 So.2d 135.

An abuse of discretion standard also applies to the review of a trial court's general damages award. Youn v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 623 So.2d 1257, 1260 (La.1993). The fact finder has great discretion in determining the amount of damages, and appellate courts should rarely disturb such an award. Id.

DISCUSSION

For purposes of discussion, the myriad of issues raised by the parties are divided into the following four categories: (1) the S & WB's additional insured status, (2) FFIC's Credit, (3) class decertification, and (4) quantum of individual claim representatives' damage awards. We separately address each of these issues.

(1) The S & WB's additional insured status

FFIC contends that the trial court erred in holding that the S & WB is an additional insured for its 50% comparative fault. FFIC acknowledges that the contract between Capitol and the S & WB required the S & WB be named as an additional insured,9 but it contends that the court must examine the policy language to determine the scope of the coverage required. According to FFIC, under the terms of its policy a party is not an additional insured for liability resulting from that party's own negligence.

The interpretation of an additional-insured endorsement is a question of law, which requires an examination of the language of the particular endorsement to determine its meaning. Miller v. Superior Shipyard and Fabrication, Inc., 01-2907, p. 5 (La.App. 1 Cir. 8/20/03), 859 So.2d 159, 163. FFIC's policy contains a "follow form" term that provides it follows and adopts the definitions, terms, conditions, limitations, exclusions, and warranties set forth in the underlying primary policy, which was issued by Royal to Capitol.10 Royal's policy defines an "additional insured" as follows:

As noted, the trial court in its judgment made an express finding that the S & WB's liability "arises out of Capitol's work at the Algiers water tower." FFIC acknowledges that finding, but it emphasizes that the trial court also found the S & WB 50% at fault for its own negligence. FFIC argues that under its policy the coverage available to the S & WB is limited to its liability imposed as a result of Capitol's actions — vicarious (or imputed) liability — and does not extend to the S & WB's independent fault (negligence). Given the trial court's finding that the S & WB was 50% at fault, FFIC contends that the S & WB cannot be an additional insured under its policy.

In support of its position, FFIC contends that under Louisiana jurisprudence an entity that is added to an insurance policy as an additional insured by contract is only covered for its derivative liability for the negligence of the named insured. For this proposition, FFIC cites Miller, supra; and Holzenthal v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 06-0796 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/10/07), 950 So.2d 55. FFIC's reliance on these cases is misplaced.

In Miller, supra, the case was before the appellate court on remand from the Supreme Court to review a trial court's grant of a partial summary judgment in T.T.C.'s (the additional insured's) favor on the issue of its coverage as an additional-insured under Lexington's commercial general liability policy. Lexington argued, as does FFIC here, that under its named insured endorsement T.T.C. was not a named insured for its own negligence.12 Rejecting this argument, the appellate court reasoned that "[t]he plain wording of the endorsement shows that it applies to any potential liability sought to be imposed upon the additional insured (T.T.C.) because of something the named insured (Superior) is alleged to have done or failed to have done in connection with the named insured's (Superior's) operations." Miller, 01-2907 at p. 6, 859 So.2d at 163-64. The appellate court found that the plaintiff's allegation that T.T.C. was vicariously liable for the named insured's acts was within the scope of the additional-insured endorsement. The appellate court, however, noted that "[t]here is no specific allegation of T.T.C.'s individual fault." Miller, 01-2907 at p. 7, n. 6, 859 So.2d at 164. The appellate court in Miller thus was not presented with the issue presented in this case of whether the additional insured was covered for its own fault.

Nor was the issue presented in the Holzenthal case. In that case, this court affirmed the trial court's finding that the defendant-S & WB was not an additional insured. In so finding, we noted the policy at issue provided that the defendant-S & WB was an additional insured "only with respect to liability arising out of your [Brown's] operations or premises owned by or rendered to you [Brown]." Holzenthal, 06-0796 at p. 49, 950 So.2d. at 84. We further noted that there was no allegation that the defendant-S & WB's liability arose out of Brown's activities, and "no allegation that Brown was in any way negligent or failed to comply with its contractual obligations or the plans and specifications for the Project as they related to Brown." Holzenthal, 06-0796 at p. 50, 950 So.2d. at 84. We thus found that the defendant-S & WB was not covered as an additional insured because "[n]one of the plaintiffs alleged any damages arising out of Brown's operations or premises owned by or rendered to Brown." Id.

The instant case is distinguishable from both the Miller and Holzenthal case. In the instant case, Plaintiffs contend that the S & WB was individually at fault and that their damages arise out of the named insured's (Capitol's) operations. They further contend that the negligence of Capitol is paramount and the source of the S & WB's liability. This case thus presents the issue of whether an additional insured provision that restricts coverage to liability "arising out" of the named insured's "work" extends to the additional insured's own negligence. Because there apparently is no Louisiana case directly addressing the issue, we look for guidance to other state court holdings.

The majority of other state courts that have addressed the issue presented in the instant case have broadly construed the additional insured provision to find coverage. "While the insurance industry believed that this coverage would extend no further than instances where the additional insured is vicariously liable for the wrongs of the named insured, many courts have interpreted the language as providing a broader coverage grant." 4 Philip L. Bruner & Patrick J. O'Connor, Jr., Bruner & O'Connor on Construction Law, § 11:155 (2010)("Construction Law"). "Courts have been reluctant to narrowly construe the phrase `arising out of often employed in additional insured endorsements." Id.; see also Allan D. Windt, Insurance Claims & Disputes: Representation of Insurance Companies And Insureds, § 11:30 (5th ed. 2011 Supp.)(noting that "[a] small minority of courts have held that a provision making a third party an insured for liability `arising out of the named insured's operations' serves solely to make third parties insured for their vicarious liability by reason of the named insured's operations.") The majority of courts have construed this kind of additional insured endorsement broadly "giving it a causal interpretation." Construction Law, supra.; Evanston Ins. Co. v. ATOFINA Petrochemicals, Inc., 256 S.W.3d 660, 666 (Tex.2008)(noting that the majority of courts have construed such endorsements using a "broader theory of causation.") Under the majority view, a "fault-based interpretation of this kind of additional insured endorsement no longer prevails." Evanston, supra.

In reaching this result, the courts adopting the majority view have emphasized the insurer's failure to include language in its policy clearly reflecting the intent that coverage extend only to the named insured's wrongs. See Evanston, supra (noting that had the parties intended to insure the additional insured's vicarious liability only "language clearly embodying that intention was available"); Mid-Continent Cas. Co. v. Chevron Pipe Line Co., 205 F.3d 222, 229 (5 Cir.2000)(noting that the "[insurer] easily could have limited coverage by including in the endorsement terms such as `vicarious liability' or `negligence of the named insured.'")

The majority view, broadly construing this type of endorsement as extending coverage to the additional insured's own negligence, is consistent with the jurisprudence of this state. The Louisiana jurisprudence, albeit in addressing other coverage questions, has broadly construed similarly worded additional insured endorsements. Roundtree v. New Orleans Aviation Bd., 04-0702, pp. 17-18 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/4/05), 896 So.2d 1078, 1090 (citing Gates v. James River Corp. of Nevada, 602 So.2d 1119 (La.App. 1st Cir.1992); Baker v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 32,651, 32,767 (La.App. 2 Cir. 3/3/00), 753 So.2d 1011; and Fleniken v. Entergy Corp., 99-3024 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/16/01), 790 So.2d 64). For this reason, we adopt the majority view. Broadly construing the additional insured provision at issue, we find no error in the trial court's finding that the S & WB was covered as an additional insured under FFIC's policy for its own negligence.

(2) FFIC's Credit

The parties raise on appeal two separate issues regarding FFIC's Credit. Plaintiffs, in their answer to the appeal, contest the amount of FFIC's Credit. FFIC, in its appeal, cites the doctrine of compensation as requiring the dismissal of the individual named class representatives' claims, for which a judgment of $140,000 was rendered, given FFIC's Credit of $3,889,623.90. We separately address each issue.

(a) Amount of FFIC's Credit

As noted, Plaintiffs contest the amount of FFIC's Credit. Based on the per occurrence coverage limit in Royal's policy, Plaintiffs contend that the amount of FFIC's Credit should be reduced by one million dollars — from $3,889,623.90 to $2,889,623.90.13 This position, however, is inconsistent with the position Plaintiffs have advocated throughout the protracted procedural history of this case. Indeed, Plaintiffs never raised the issue of whether the Credit should be reduced in the trial court. FFIC contends that Plaintiffs therefore are precluded from raising this issue for the first time on appeal. We agree.

Under the jurisprudence there is a "longstanding general rule that issues not submitted to the trial court for decision will not be considered for the first time on appeal." ASP Enterprises, Inc. v. Guillory, 08-2235, p. 9 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/11/09), 22 So.3d 964, 971; In re Succession of Bernat, 11-368, p. 3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/2/11), 76 So.3d 1287, 1290 (refusing to consider issue raised for first time on appeal). As this court has noted "[i]t is well established that as a general matter, appellate courts will not consider issues raised for the first time, which were not pleaded in the trial court below and which the trial court has not addressed." Billieson v. City of New Orleans, 09-0410, p. 8 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/12/09), 26 So.3d 796, 801-02 (citing Johnson v. State, 02-2382, p. 4 (La.5/20/03), 851 So.2d 918, 921).

This general rule is codified in the Uniform Rules of Louisiana Courts of Appeal, which provide: "[t]he Courts of Appeal will review only issues which were submitted to the trial court and which are contained in specifications or assignments of error, unless the interest of justice clearly requires otherwise." Uniform Rules — Courts of Appeal, Rule 1-3. Pursuant to Rule 1-3, this court cannot consider an issue that was not raised in the trial court "unless the interest of justice clearly requires otherwise." See Brown v. Harrel, 98-2931, pp. 5-6 (La.App. 4 Cir. 8/23/00), 774 So.2d 225, 229 (citing Whitney Nat'l Bank v. F.W.F., Inc., 93-1152, p. 2, n. 1 (La.App. 4th Cir. 3/29/94), 635 So.2d 361, 363 and cases cited therein). Contrary to Plaintiffs' suggestion, this is not a situation in which "the interest of justice requires otherwise."

The protracted procedural history of this case dictates against allowing Plaintiffs to raise the issue of the reduction in FFIC's Credit for the first time on appeal. In April 2005, Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment in which they contended that the aggregate coverage limit of $2,000,000 — as opposed to the per occurrence limit of $1,000,000 — applied. In their motion, Plaintiffs framed the coverage issue as follows: "Louisiana case law holds that the events that form the basis of this action are a series of separate and distinct occurrences. [See Lombard v. Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans, 284 So.2d 905 (La.1973).] Royal's position is that what occurred over a 4 month period of time on distinct separate days constitutes one single occurrence." Plaintiffs thus argued that the "general aggregate" limits of Royal's policy ($2,000,000.00) applied; whereas, Royal argued that the "per occurrence" limit ($1,000,000.00) applied. Finding in Plaintiffs' favor, the trial court declared that the general aggregate limits of Royal's policy ($2,000,000.00) applied. In September 2006, this court declined to consider Royal's appeal from this judgment on the basis that the partial summary judgment should not have been certified final and appealable. Jones v. Capitol Enterprises, 06-0163 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/20/06), 939 So.2d 742 (unpub.).

In August 2007, Plaintiffs entered into a partial settlement agreement with several defendants, including Royal, based on an understanding that Royal's coverage equaled its aggregate limit of $2,000,000.00. In settling their claim against Royal, Plaintiffs thus took advantage of the higher aggregate limit.

In June 2008, following the trial, the trial court rendered judgment setting forth FFIC's Credit as $3,889,623.90. In their motion for new trial from that judgment, Plaintiffs failed to raise any issue regarding the amount of FFIC's Credit. To the contrary, Plaintiffs stated: "[o]n the substantive arguments directed to insurance coverage, plaintiffs respectfully submit that the Court was correct in its analysis and that no changes are warranted." In March 2011, the trial court rendered an amended judgment, which was based on Plaintiffs' proposed judgment, setting forth FFIC's Credit as $3,889,623.90.

In their answer to FFIC's appeal from the March 2011 judgment, Plaintiffs now seek to take the opposite position: that the per occurrence limit ($1,000,000.00) applies and that FFIC's Credit should only be $2,889,623.90. Stated otherwise, Plaintiffs contend that the Credit should be reduced by one million dollars.

Given the above procedural history of the case, it would be inequitable to allow Plaintiffs to argue this contrary position at this stage of the proceeding regarding the underlying coverage on which FFIC's credit is based. We thus decline to consider the issue of the reduction in the amount of FFIC's Credit.

(b) Compensation doctrine

As noted, FFIC's compensation argument is that the seven named class representatives' claims, having been reduced to final judgment in the amount of $140,000 ($20,000 each), must be offset against its credit of $3,889,623.90, and that their claims thus must be dismissed with prejudice. In support of this argument, FFIC cites the compensation doctrine codified in La. C.C. art. 1893, which provides:

In order for compensation, or any other form of set off, to apply a mutuality of obligations is required, i.e., "where each obligor owes the other a debt equally liquidated and demandable." Ducote v. City of Alexandria, 95-1197, pp. 12-13 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/6/96), 670 So.2d 1378, 1386 (citing La. C.C. art. 1893 and collecting cases). "[D]efendant must be the creditor with respect to one obligation and debtor with respect to the other and vice versa for the plaintiffs." Ducote, 95-1197 at p. 13, 670 So.2d at 1386. Although under the trial court's judgment FFIC owes an obligation to Plaintiffs for the amount of damages established to exceed FFIC's Credit, Plaintiffs do not owe a separate and distinct obligation to FFIC. FFIC's Credit is based not on an obligation owed to it by Plaintiffs, but on the nature of its contractual obligation as an excess insurer. As an excess insurer it has an obligation "to pay amounts over and above the primary policy limits." Louisiana Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 93-0911 (La.1/14/94), 630 So.2d 759, 765. Indeed, the obligations of a primary and an excess insurer are conjunctive obligations that can be enforced separately. 15 William Shelby McKenzie & H. Alston Johnson, III, La. Civ. L. Treatise, Insurance Law & Practice § 221 (3d ed. 2011-12 Update)(citing Benroth v. Continental Cas. Co., 132 F.Supp. 270, 275 (W.D.La.1955)). FFIC's reliance on the compensation doctrine is misplaced.

FFIC is not entitled to have the named class representatives' claims dismissed for another reason. The trial court, in the amended judgment, rendered judgment in favor of not only the seven named class representatives, but also the other class members for damages "hereafter determined." As Plaintiffs point out, FFIC's obligation to the class must be determined based on the aggregate sum of the judgments of all the class members, whose claims must be individually tried. FFIC's obligation to the class, including the named class representatives, is yet to be determined. For this reason, FFIC's obligation to the class is neither liquidated nor presently due as required for La. C.C. art. 1893 to apply.

Plaintiffs point out that dismissing the named class representatives' claims would defeat the whole purpose of a class action. Plaintiffs further point out that dismissal of the class representatives' claims is inappropriate because it would be patently unfair for those claimants who prove their damages in earlier trials to bear a total offset instead of a pro rata allocation spread out over the class as a whole. Plaintiffs note that "[t]hose who initially appear and receive awards decreasing the credit are just as entitled in a class action to receive compensation as those later determined by the court." To achieve this result, Plaintiffs posit the following solution: "all class members will have to wait until all damages are awarded and the credit will be prorated to each member of the class taking into consideration the amounts a member has already received."

FFIC counters that Plaintiffs' "hold all the damage judgments till the end" solution is procedurally impermissible because the trial court has rendered a final judgment awarding damages to each of the individual class representatives. The final judgment, FFIC contends, cannot be held in abeyance pending the determination of other class members' damages. FFIC's argument ignores that this is a class action. Its argument also overlooks that FFIC's Credit is a "class wide credit," arising from a class wide settlement with the underlying insurers. We thus find no error in the trial court's refusal of FFIC's request to dismiss the claims of the named class representatives based on the compensation doctrine.

(3) Class decertification

FFIC contends that the trial court erred in implicitly denying its motion to decertify the class. The governing provision regarding decertification is La. C.C.P. art. 592 A(3)(c), which provides:

Article 592 allows a trial judge to decertify a class at any time before a decision on the merits of the common issues.

In this case, the trial court has rendered a decision on the merits of the common issues of the liability of the nominal defendants (Capital and S & WB) and FFIC's insurance coverage. For this reason, FFIC's motion to decertify, which was filed as part of its motion for new trial, arguably is untimely. Arguing to the contrary, FFIC contends that it first raised the decertification issue in its motion for new trial because this was the first available procedural opportunity for it to raise the issue. FFIC explains that the decertification issue it raises was created by the trial court's recognition in its reasons for judgment of the ramifications of Plaintiffs' piecemeal settlement. According to FFIC, the settlement has resulted in the class action device becoming an inferior method of resolving the claims given FFIC's Credit. In support of its timeliness argument, FFIC cites the jurisprudence holding that class certification decisions are interlocutory in nature and thus always subject to review. See Davis v. Jazz Casino Co., 03-0276, 03-1223 (La.6/6/03), 849 So.2d 497, 498.

Plaintiffs do not contest the timeliness of FFIC's motion; rather, they contest the appropriateness of revisiting the issue of certification at this point in the case. Plaintiffs contend that a class action is an appropriate procedural vehicle for class members to pursue damages from an excess insurer after a class settlement with the underlying primary insurers has been reached.

Because the trial court's judgment is silent as to the motion to decertify, it is unclear if the trial court found FFIC's motion unpersuasive or untimely. Given Plaintiffs' failure to contest the timeliness of FFIC's motion coupled with our determination that FFIC's decertification arguments are unpersuasive, we pretermit the issue of whether FFIC's motion was untimely.

FFIC's argument regarding decertification has two components: a constitutional argument and a substantive one. Its substantive argument overlaps with its argument regarding dismissing the class representatives' claims, addressed above. FFIC contends that Plaintiffs' partial settlement and the resulting FFIC Credit have created an unworkable conflict within the putative class and an unworkable procedural situation. FFIC further contends that Plaintiffs' own "hold all the damage judgments till the end" solution demonstrates the inherent conflict created if the action is allowed to continue as a class action. The conflict, according to FFIC, is the result of the almost four million dollar credit that must be exhausted before any plaintiff can recover from FFIC. Moreover, FFIC contends that even if the "hold all the damage judgments till the end" solution posited by Plaintiffs is procedurally permissible, "the conflict would still exist, because potentially thousands of plaintiffs would have to stand in line to go to trial without having any assurance of ever receiving an actual recovery on their claims" from FFIC due to FFIC's Credit. Hence, FFIC contends that class certification is not a superior means of resolving Plaintiffs' claims.

In support of its position, FFIC cites the Louisiana Supreme Court's recent decision Price v. Martin, 11-0853, p. 6 (La.12/6/11), 79 So.3d 960, 966, for the proposition that a "rigorous analysis" is required of the factors for determining whether a class action meets the requirements imposed by law. One of those factors is whether "a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." La. C.C.P. art. 591 B(3). FFIC points out that in Price, supra, which like this case was an emissions class action, the Supreme Court found certification inappropriate due to the inherent conflicts among the class members. In so holding, the Supreme Court noted that:

Price, 11-0853 at p. 19, 79 So.3d at 974 (citing Barrett v. T.L. James & Co., 28,170, pp. 6-7 (La.App. 2 Cir. 4/3/96), 671 So.2d 1186, 1191). FFIC contends that the application of the "rigorous analysis" required by Price of the certification factors to the circumstances of this case dictates that the class be decertified. In support, FFIC cites the unworkable conflict created by the partial settlement and the resulting recognition of FFIC's Credit.

FFIC's reliance on the Price case is misplaced. In Price, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether the trial court's decision certifying the class, which the appellate court affirmed, was correct. In stark contrast, the class in this case was certified in 2004 (no appeal was taken from that decision), Plaintiffs settled with multiple defendants in 2007, Plaintiffs tried common issues of liability and coverage in 2007, the trial court rendered judgment in 2008, and the trial court granted the cross motions for new trial and rendered an amended judgment in 2011, which is the subject of this appeal. The instant case is therefore in a vastly different procedural posture than the Price case.

A significant factor that courts consider in deciding the issue of class decertification is "`whether the parties or the class would be unfairly prejudiced by a change in proceedings at that point.'" 3 Alba Conte and Herbert Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions, § 7:47 (4th ed.2002)(quoting Manual for Complex Litigation, § 30.18 (2d ed.)). Such is the case here. If FFIC's request to decertify the class were granted, FFIC would be dismissed from the class action. Pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 594 A(2), the class members would be given a notice of the decertification. Pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 596, the class members would have a window of time to decide whether to file their own individual suits against FFIC. Such a change in proceedings at this point would result in unfair prejudice to the class members whose individual expense of litigating their claims would outweigh any potential recovery.

The appropriateness of the procedural device of a class action to aid plaintiffs in recovering damages in this type of situation was noted by this court in Doerr v. Mobil Oil Corp., 04-1789, p. 10 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/14/06), 935 So.2d 231, 238. Writing for the court, Judge Murray explained:

Id. For these same reasons, we conclude that it would be patently unfair to the class members to decertify the class at this procedural juncture of the case.

This court has further noted that "`[i]n the absence of materially changed or clarified circumstances, or the occurrence of a condition on which the initial class ruling was expressly contingent, courts should not condone a series of rearguments on the class issues by either the proponent or the opponent of class, in the guise of motions to reconsider the class ruling.'" Billieson v. City of New Orleans, 09-0410, 09-811, p. 9 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/12/09), 26 So.3d 796, 802 (quoting Doerr, 04-1789 at p. 4, 935 So.2d at 234 (quoting Newberg, supra)). Contrary to FFIC's contention, the trial court's recognition of FFIC's Credit does not constitute a material change in the circumstances of this case warranting reconsideration of the trial court's class certification ruling.

As noted, FFIC's decertification argument also includes a constitutional component. Its constitutional argument is that due process and fundamental fairness considerations dictate granting its motion to decertify. In support, FFIC points out that the trial court's March 2004 certification judgment should not apply to it because it was not yet a party to the suit, and it was not given an opportunity to appear and present evidence at the original certification hearing. FFIC further points out that its status as an excess insurer places it in a different position from the other defendants insofar as class certification issues are concerned. Its position is different in that most, if not all, the class members will not have a claim against it until the underlying limits of $3,889,623.90 (FFIC's Credit) are exhausted.

Plaintiffs respond that the issue of decertification is not required to be reconsidered when other parties are added after the class is certified. In support of this contention, they cite Martello v. City of Ferriday, 04-90 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/3/04), 886 So.2d 645. In Martello, the court addressed whether under La. C.C.P. art 592 an additional certification hearing is necessary when a plaintiff adds new defendants to a previously certified class action. Answering that question in the negative, the court explained that "[t]he clear wording of Article 592(A)(1) requires that a motion to certify the action as a class action must be filed `within ninety days after service on all adverse parties of the initial pleading.'" Martello, 04-90 at p. 4, 886 So.2d at 648. The court further explained that it is common "for an initial petition in a class action to be amended, sometimes several times, prior to a determination on the merits." Martello, 04-90 at p. 3, 886 So.2d at 648. The court thus concluded that "Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 592(A)(1) does not require that a new certification hearing be requested each time a petition is amended, either to add an additional defendant or to set forth a new cause of action." Martello, 04-90 at pp. 3-4, 886 So.2d at 648.; see also Sellers v. El Paso Indus. Energy, L.P., 08-403, p. 12 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/10/09), 8 So.3d 723, 729. Plaintiffs contend that FFIC is simply attempting to obtain an appeal of the class certification ruling.

FFIC's constitutional arguments are unpersuasive. "A class action is simply a procedural device; it confers no substantive rights." Galjour v. Bank One Equity Investors-Bidco, Inc., 05-1360, p. 7 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/21/06), 935 So.2d 716, 723. We thus conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to grant FFIC's motion to decertify.

(4) Quantum of individual class representatives' damage awards

The final issue to be addressed is FFIC's contention that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding $20,000 in compensatory damages to each of the named class representatives. To provide a factual background for addressing the damage issue, it is necessary to summarize the evidence presented at trial regarding the damage sustained by each of the seven named class representatives as a result of the Algiers Water Tower project. All seven class representatives testified that they were exposed to sand and particles as a result of the project. With the exception of Melanie Gastinell Williams, all the class representatives testified that at the time of the project they lived in the neighborhood abutting the Algiers Water Tower in homes that they owned.14 The following is a summary of the class representative's individual testimony.15

a) Helene Benn Jones:

b) Johnny Jones, III:

c) Barbara Benn:

d) Evelyn Gastinell:

e) Melanie Gastinell Williams:

f) Bernice Noil:

g) Augustine Cook:

Also at trial, FFIC introduced the testimony of Dr. Merlin Wilson, who was qualified as an expert in the field of medicine with a specialty in allergies. In preparation for trial, Dr. Wilson was asked to review the depositions of all seven class representatives and the medical records of Ms. Gastinell, Mr. Jones, and Ms. Cook. Dr. Wilson initially testified that he found no complaints of an increased problem during the time span of the water tower project (late 2001 to June 2002). However, on cross-examination he acknowledged that on February 19, 2002, Ms. Cook was seen at Medical Center of Louisiana (Charity) and that her medical records for that date state: "presents for sinus problems with a new complaint of problems with ... hoarseness, sinus problems, chronic sinusitis." Dr. Wilson thus acknowledged that Ms. Cook presented at the doctor with complaints during the pertinent time period.

Dr. Wilson was also questioned by Plaintiffs' counsel regarding the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health ("NIOSH") Pocket Guide To Chemical Hazards — Silica ("NIOSH Guide.")18 Dr. Wilson was asked to read the line in that guide addressing the potential symptoms that can result from exposure to silica sand; he replied: "[c]ough, shortness of breath, a decreased pulmonary function, progressive respiratory symptoms." He added that although these can be symptoms, "those are probably not allergic mediated." Dr. Wilson also testified that he did not see in any of the documents he reviewed any allergic reactions caused by the sandblasting project. He acknowledged that exposure to silica "can act as an irritant and make you cough, things like that." He further acknowledged that he was not testifying that the individual class representatives did not experience what they related in their depositions or testimony, but "only that they didn't visit the doctor for that specific problem."

Based on the evidence presented at trial, the trial court found that "the class representatives did in fact suffer injuries as a direct result of the project on the Algiers Water Tower." The court found that "extensive amounts of silica dust was emitted from the project and found its way into the neighborhood and impacted a substantial amount of people." In support of this finding, the court cited the testimony of Dr. Mitchell, Plaintiffs' air modeling expert, that "the neighborhoods adjacent to the Water Tower were impacted by significant considerations of particulate matter." Based on its findings, the trial court determined that causation was established and that an award of $20,000 in compensatory damages to each of the class representatives was appropriate.

FFIC contends that neither the evidence in the record nor the jurisprudence supports a $20,000 award to each of the class representatives under the circumstances presented in this case. FFIC further contends that the $20,000 awards are inconsistent with the trial court's class-wide awards. As FFIC points out, the trial court in its reasons for judgment outlined geographic zones based on proximity to the water tower. Relying on those geographic zones, the trial court awarded class-wide damages ranging from $1,000 to $4,000. Although the trial court's amended judgment eliminates the class-wide awards, FFIC contends that the class-wide awards remain relevant. The relevance, FFIC explains, is that those class-wide awards, which ranged from $1,000 to $4,000, establish that the trial court's awards to the class representatives of $20,000 each for the same injuries cannot be justified and thus are arbitrary. In support, FFIC cites the jurisprudence holding that the class representatives' claims must be "`a cross-section of, or typical of, the claims of all class members.'" Billieson v. City of New Orleans, 98-1232, p. 17 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/3/99), 729 So.2d 146, 157.

Plaintiffs counter that the class-wide damage awards in the trial court's original judgment have been reversed by the granting of the motion for new trial and are no longer pertinent.19 Plaintiffs further contend that the awards to each class representative are reasonable and within the trial court's vast discretion for physical injury, property damage, mental anguish damage, and nuisance over an almost four month period.

FFIC's reliance on the class-wide damage awards is misplaced for two reasons. First, the award of damages is an individual determination that must be made "based upon testimony as to an individual's actual damages, not on expert testimony that it was `reasonable' to assume someone closer to the source [ (release site) ] would suffer more damage than someone farther away." Howard v. Union Carbide Corp., 09-2750 at p. 1 (La. 10/19/10), 50 So.3d 1251, 1257-58 (Victory, J., concurring). Second, as Plaintiffs point out, the class-wide damage awards were set aside as a result of the granting of the cross motions for new trial. Under these circumstances, an appellate court may only review the second judgment for error. Wilson v. Compass Dockside, Inc., 93-1860 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/15/94), 635 So.2d 1171, 1176 (on reh'g). The class-wide damage awards thus are not before us on appeal and are not pertinent to our analysis of the class representatives' damage awards.

Nonetheless, we find the trial court's reasons for judgment are pertinent in reviewing the awards to the class representatives. Indeed, in its reasons for judgment, the trial court focuses on the trial testimony of the seven named class representatives in discussing the damages issue. Both the trial court's original judgment and the amended judgment include the same lump sum damage award of $20,000 each to the class representatives.

It is well settled that the fact finder has great discretion in determining the amount of damages and that appellate courts should rarely disturb such an award. Youn, supra. Another well settled principle is that a lump sum damage award is presumed to award all items of damages claimed. Bryan v. City of New Orleans, 98-1263 (La. 1/20/99); 737 So.2d 696, 697 (collecting cases); Smith v. Tidewater Inc., 04-0195, p. 16 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/2/05), 918 So.2d 1, 13; Dupuy v. Fitzpatrick, 00-1353, p. 7 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/23/01), 789 So.2d 667, 671; Dorvilier v. Gagliano, 02-2765, p. 11 (La.App. 4 Cir. 8/27/03), 855 So.2d 393, 400-01; see also Frank L. Maraist and Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Louisiana Tort Law § 7.2 (1996)(noting that "if a factfinder makes an in globo award, it generally is deemed to include all types of recoverable damages.")

When as in this case a lump sum award is challenged as excessive, the "appellant's burden of proving an abuse of discretion is more difficult because the intent to award a specific amount for a particular item is not readily ascertainable." Reichert v. Bertucci, 96-1213, pp. 4-5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/4/96), 684 So.2d 1041, 1044 (citing Boutte v. Nissan Motor Corp., 94-1470, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 9/13/95), 663 So.2d 154, 161). To illustrate, this court in Matthews v. Ferrer, 95-0266, p. 8 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/30/95), 665 So.2d 1211, 1215, affirmed a lump-sum award that included special and general damages. In addressing whether the general damage component of the award was excessive, we subtracted the special damages that were proven at trial from the lump sum and reviewed the remainder as general damages.

In this case, the trial court in its amended judgment awarded each class representative a lump sum award of $20,000 in compensatory damages. In its reasons for judgment, the trial court explained that the lump sum award was for the following four categories of damages: (i) physical pain and suffering, (ii) property damage, (iii) mental anguish, and (iv) nuisance. In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in making the lump sum awards, we find it appropriate to divide our analysis into two parts: (1) the four categories of damages; and (2) the lump sum award.

(1) The Four Categories of Damages

The first category of damages is physical pain and suffering. In awarding damages for physical pain and suffering, the trial court noted that the class representatives' testimony established that they successfully met their burden of proving the physical injuries they suffered were a result of the defendants' fault.20 In so finding, the trial court reasoned:

FFIC contends that because the symptoms alleged by the class representatives were neither severe nor permanent the trial court's awards for physical pain and suffering were an abuse of discretion for four reasons:

FFIC's argument regarding improperly rewarding the class representatives is based on the trial court's class-wide awards included in its original judgment. As discussed above, FFIC's reliance on the class-wide awards is misplaced.

FFIC's next focuses on what it terms the class representatives' "minor, transient" symptoms. It contends that the class representatives' own testimony confirms that their alleged physical injuries were short term in duration and minor in severity. FFIC emphasizes that the jurisprudence holds that the primary factors to be considered in assessing the quantum of general damages for pain and suffering are severity and duration. The jurisprudence, however, also holds that general damages cannot be fixed with exactitude and that no mechanical rule exists for calculating general damages; rather, such damages are based on the particular facts and circumstances of each case. See Holford v. Allstate Ins. Co., 41,187, p. 7 (La.App. 2 Cir. 6/28/06), 935 So.2d 758, 763 (citing Blue v. Donnie Baines Cartemps USA, 38,279, pp. 4-5 (La.App. 2 Cir. 3/3/04), 868 So.2d 246, 249). Whether the damages for physical pain and suffering are an abuse of discretion thus turns on the particular facts of the particular case.

FFIC's next argument is that the class representatives failed to introduce medical evidence as to either the causation or the severity of their personal injuries. The trial court, rejecting the contention that medical evidence was required in this case, took "particular note of damages being awarded [in cases involving substances being generated from a project] without the rendition of formal medical treatment," citing as an example In re New Orleans Train Car Leakage Fire Litigation, 00-1919 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/20/05), 903 So.2d 9. FFIC contends that the trial court erred in finding medical evidence of causation and damages was not required.

FFIC cites the well-settled jurisprudence holding that "expert medical testimony is required when the conclusion regarding medical causation is one that is not within common knowledge." Chavers v. Travis, 04-0992, p. 10 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/20/05), 902 So.2d 389, 395; Hutchinson v. Shah, 94-264, p. 3 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/22/94), 648 So.2d 451, 452 (citing Lasha v. Olin Corp., 625 So.2d 1002, 1005 (La.1995))(noting that "when the conclusion regarding medical causation is not one within common knowledge, expert medical testimony if required.") FFIC contends that "questions concerning the effects of silica in differing concentrations, distances and durations on individual plaintiffs are not `within common knowledge.'" It thus contends that the common knowledge exception does not apply in this case. In support of this contention, FFIC cites Johnson v. E.I. DuPont deNemours & Co., 08-628 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1/13/09), 7 So.3d 734.

In Johnson, supra, which was a suit for damages allegedly caused by chemical exposure from a plant explosion, the appellate court rejected the argument that the common knowledge exception applied. The court reasoned that "whether or not plaintiffs suffered injuries as a result of chemical exposure from the Dupont incident is not a determination based on common knowledge, so the plaintiffs were required to present expert medical testimony in order to meet their burden of proving medical causation." Johnson, 08-628 at p. 8, 7 So.3d at 740. FFIC contends that the trial court erred in failing to impose the same requirement on the class representatives in this case. As a result, FFIC contends that the class representatives failed to link their alleged physical injuries to the project.

Plaintiffs, on the other hand, contend that expert medical evidence was not required and that their failure to obtain formal medical treatment for their symptoms does not defeat their claims. Plaintiffs point out that their claims are not based on esoteric problems that would require proof by expert medical testimony. Rather, their claims are for symptoms within the common knowledge of the trial court to comprehend. Plaintiffs thus contend the trial court correctly concluded that expert medical testimony was not required to establish the class representations' physical reactions and complaints of personal injuries they sustained as a result of their exposure to the sand (silica) from the project. Additionally, Plaintiffs point out that the evidence they introduced included the NIOSH Guide, which enumerates the expected reactions to silica exposure. (As noted above, Dr. Wilson was questioned regarding the NIOSH Guide.)

General damages for pain and suffering may be established in three ways: (i) the circumstances of the case, (ii) expert medical testimony, and (iii) the tort victim's testimony. Frank L. Maraist & Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Louisiana Tort Law § 7-2(c)(1996). In this case, causation of the class representatives' physical pain and suffering as a result of the project was adequately established based on the circumstances of the case and the class representatives' testimony. See Arabie v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 10-2605 (La.3/13/12), 89 So.3d 307 (rejecting defendant's argument that in order to prove causation plaintiffs were required to prove exposure by scientific evidence of air monitoring data). Thus, the trial court correctly concluded that medical evidence was not required to establish causation of the class representatives' physical pain and suffering claims.

Although FFIC invites us to resort to a consideration of awards for generically similar symptoms and contends that the awards in this case are disproportionate to such prior awards for minor transient symptoms, the jurisprudence is settled that "resort to prior awards is only appropriate after an appellate court has concluded that an `abuse of discretion' has occurred." Cone v. National Emergency Services, Inc., 99-0934, p. 8 (La.10/29/99), 747 So.2d 1085, 1089. As subsequently discussed in this opinion, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's awards for physical pain and suffering. Because we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's awards, a comparison of similar prior awards is inappropriate. See Jones v. Harris, 04-0965, pp. 3-4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/2/05), 896 So.2d 237, 240-41.

Finally, although FFIC contends that the trial court's award of $20,000 per class representative is excessive for physical pain and suffering, this argument overlooks that this award is not solely for physical pain and suffering, but rather it is a lump sum award for all four categories of damages.

The second category of damages the trial court awarded is property damages. FFIC contends that the trial court's award of $20,000 for property damages to each of the class representatives is erroneous because "none of the class representatives introduced sufficient evidence to warrant a substantial property damage award." FFIC emphasizes that the class representatives failed to introduce any receipts, invoices, or estimates as to the cost of repairing their property.

Addressing this argument, the trial court noted that the Defendants advocated the need for repair estimates based on a case involving a body shop, particularly Gagliano v. Namias, 479 So.2d 23, 25 (La. App. 4th Cir.1985). In Gagliano, this court noted:

Gagliano, 479 So.2d at 25 (citing Decuir v. Sam Broussard, Inc., 459 So.2d 1375 (La. App. 3rd Cir.1984)(citing Roshong v. Travelers Ins. Co., 281 So.2d 785 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1973))). Finding the lack of this type of evidence did not defeat the class representatives' property damage claims, the trial court noted that "a more general application of the law" was required that that advocated by Defendants. The trial court further noted that under La. C.C. art. 2315 the term "damages" has been construed to mean "`pecuniary compensation, recompense, or satisfaction for injury sustained.'" Wainwright v. Fontenot, 00-0492, p. 5 (La.10/17/00), 774 So.2d 70, 74 (quoting Fogle v. Feazel, 201 La. 899, 10 So.2d 695, 698 (1942)).

The trial court found that the class representatives met their burden of establishing Defendants' negligence and that Defendants' breach of duty was a direct cause of their property damage, which occurred as a direct result of the sandblasting project. The trial court noted the following examples of property damage that the class representatives established they sustained as a direct result of the project:

Although FFIC in challenging the property damage award contends that the $20,000 award is excessive, this argument ignores the lump sum nature of the award.

The third and fourth category of damages that the trial court awarded to the class representatives are mental anguish and nuisance. Because of the overlap of these two categories, we address them together for ease of discussion. The jurisprudence has limited the recovery of mental anguish for damages to one's property to four categories of cases:

Doerr v. Mobil Oil Corp., 04-1789, pp. 8-9 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/14/06), 935 So.2d 231, 237 (citing Frank L. Maraist and Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Louisiana Tort Law § 7.02[6] (2d ed.2004)).

Recognizing the jurisprudential limit on mental anguish damages, the trial court found the evidence presented at trial established that the requirements for the third subcategory — a continuing nuisance — were met. In so finding, the trial court cited La. C.C. art. 667.21 Based on Article 667 and the jurisprudence construing that article, the trial court found that the water tower project constituted a continuing nuisance to the class members' property. The trial court further found that the class representatives were entitled to compensatory damages, including damages for "physical ailments, ongoing property issues, and excessive noise disturbances." The trial court still further found that such damages were due for the nuisance endured throughout the project.

On appeal, FFIC contends that the trial court's finding of a continuing nuisance is erroneous. FFIC contends that this case is analogous to Barrett v. T.L. James & Co., 28,170 (La.App. 2 Cir. 4/3/96), 671 So.2d 1186. In Barrett, the appellate court affirmed a finding that the plaintiffs failed to establish the defendant's operation of a concrete recycling project in connection with a highway reconstruction project near their neighborhood constituted a nuisance. Similar to the instant case, the plaintiffs in Barrett alleged they suffered personal injury (upper respiratory problems) caused by dust from the project and property damages caused by the accumulation of dust in their homes. Although the plaintiffs presented medical experts, their experts failed to corroborate a causal connection between the dust from the construction project and any personal injuries the plaintiffs sustained. Nor did the plaintiffs establish that the dust could not be removed from their homes by regular cleaning and vacuuming.

Based on the particular circumstances presented, the trial court in Barrett found that "the inconvenience was not unusual or extraordinary, considering the length of the project and the measures taken to minimize the project." Barrett, 28,170 at p. 4, 671 So.2d at 1190. Affirming, the appellate court reasoned that "[w]hile noise and dust do not necessarily constitute a nuisance, in some instances they may be so, depending upon the particular circumstances." Barrett, 28,170 at p. 7, 671 So.2d at 1191 (collecting cases). The holding in Barrett was thus based on the particular circumstances presented in that case, which are distinguishable from the circumstances presented in the instant case.

The relevant factors that a court must consider in making the factual finding of whether a nuisance has been established under La. C.C. art. 667 are as follows:

12 Ferdinand F. Stone, La. Civ. L. Treatise: Tort Doctrine, § 248 (1977).

Applying the above factors, the trial court found the particular circumstances presented here constituted a continuing nuisance. The trial court noted that because the water tower abutted a residential neighbor Defendants had a combined duty to use "utmost caution" throughout the project, and Defendants breached their duty by using an 85% shroud as opposed to the mandatory 100% shroud. The trial court further found that Defendants should have known that this deviation would result in particle emissions that would inevitably cause damage to the abutting neighborhood residents. Finally, the trial court found Defendants "could have prevented the resulting damages by exercising reasonable care and implementing the use of the 100% containment shroud." Contrary to FFIC's contentions, we find no manifest error in the trial court's factual finding of a continuing nuisance. Under the particular circumstances presented in the instant case, unlike the circumstances presented in Barrett, the noise and dust constituted a nuisance.

As to the mental anguish resulting from the continuing nuisance, the trial court found that the class representatives were entitled to damages throughout the duration of the project. The trial court noted that all the class representatives testified they experienced mental anguish and emotional distress as a direct result of the sandblasting activities. The court further noted that:

We find the trial court's determination that the class representatives established their claims for mental anguish is not manifestly erroneous. As the above summary of the class representatives' testimony indicates, many of them complained of the noise from the project disrupting their daily activities. They all complained of experiencing inconvenience as a result of the project.

As noted, the trial court found the mental anguish damages that the class representatives were entitled to recover for nuisance were for their "physical ailments, ongoing property issues, and excessive noise disturbances." FFIC contends that the trial court erred in including in this part of the award elements of damages that are encompassed in its prior awards for personal injuries and property damages. According to FFIC, the only element of mental anguish that is not encompassed in the trial court's prior awards is for the class representative's loss of sleep caused by the noise disturbances. FFIC contends that an award of $20,000 for this claim is clearly excessive. Again, FFIC's reference to the $20,000 award ignores the lump sum nature of the award. Likewise, FFIC's argument regarding the duplicative nature of the award is belied by the lump sum nature of the award.

In sum, we find the record supports the trial court's finding that the class representatives were entitled to recover all four categories of damages included in the lump sum award.

(2) Lump Sum Award

Given that the record supports the trial court's finding that the individual class representatives established their entitlement to damages for physical pain and suffering, property damage, mental anguish, and nuisance, we turn to the final issue presented of whether the lump sum award of $20,000 to each class representative for all four categories of damages is an abuse of discretion. FFIC contends that the awards are an abuse of discretion for all the reasons noted above. Plaintiffs counter that the trial court's lump sum awards are not an abuse of discretion given "the ongoing length of time the plaintiffs were exposed, their physical complaints, the mental anguish and upset they suffered, the affront to their families and neighborhood, and the physical damages they sustained to their property." The gist of Plaintiffs' argument is that the synergistic effect of all the injuries they endured for the duration of the project supports the amount of the lump sum awards. We agree.

The jurisprudence is well settled that "the discretion vested in the trier of fact is `great,' and even vast, so that an appellate court should rarely disturb an award of general damages." Youn, 623 So.2d at 1261. As noted, another jurisprudential principle applicable here is that the appellant's burden of establishing such an abuse of discretion is greater when the trial court has made a lump sum damage award. Applying these principles, we find the trial court's award in this case is not an abuse of discretion. Given the particular circumstances presented in this case and the testimony of each of the class representatives regarding the particular damages they each experienced as a result of the project, we cannot conclude that the $20,000 in compensatory damages awarded to each of the seven named class representatives is excessive. We thus find that it unnecessary to resort to a review of damage awards made in other similar cases.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED